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A Dangerous Situation –
The Knowing Transmission of HIV
in an Out-of-Body Form and
Whether New York Should
Criminally Punish Those Who
Commit Such an Act
Griffin C. Kenyon*
I.

Introduction

In June 2013 the New York State Court of Appeals (“Court
of Appeals”) held that the saliva of a defendant afflicted with the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”) does not constitute a
dangerous instrument so as to support a conviction for
aggravated assault.1 Despite this holding, the question remains
whether the administration of HIV in an out-of-body form to
another individual qualifies for dangerous instrument
treatment so as to subject greater criminal liability under the
New York State Penal Law (“Penal Law”).2 Another question
remains – should New York punish those who knowingly
transmit HIV to another individual?
If so, should the
punishment be charged through the Penal Law or through other
state legislation? If this legislation does not exist, what should
New York consider when drafting legislation?
Part I of this article provides an overview of HIV and how it
can be transmitted to an individual. Part II analyzes the Penal
Law’s current provisions on dangerous instruments and
penalties imposed by these provisions. Part III discusses New
* J.D. candidate 2015, Pace University School of Law; B.A. 2010, Hamilton
College. I would like to thank my family and friends, and those who I’ve worked
with throughout my undergraduate, law school, and work experiences.
1. See generally People v. Plunkett, 971 N.E.2d 363 (N.Y. 2012).
2. See generally John M. Castellano, People v. Plunkett: HIV-Infected
Saliva Not a Dangerous Instrument, 2013 EMERGING ISSUES 6946 (2013).
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York case law on dangerous instruments. Part IV evaluates
whether administering HIV in an out-of-body form qualifies for
dangerous instrument treatment under the Penal Law and New
York case law standards. Part V provides an overview of
relevant case law on the question of whether a hypodermic
needle constitutes a deadly weapon rather than a dangerous
instrument.
Part VI discusses statutory punishment of
defendants who knowingly transmit HIV to another individual.
Part VII analyzes factors that New York should consider when
drafting specific criminal law provisions that target the knowing
transmission of HIV. Part VIII is a brief conclusion of the
article.
II. HIV and Transmission of the Virus to an Individual
HIV stands for Human Immunodeficiency Virus. According
to AIDS.gov, HIV weakens the human immune system “by
destroying important cells that fight disease and infection.”3
Specifically, HIV targets T-cells or CD4 cells, those cells that
fight infections and diseases.4 Over time, HIV destroys these
cells so that the human body cannot fight off infections and
diseases, and when the human body cannot continue to fight
these infections and diseases, the HIV infection can lead to
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”), the final stage
of the HIV infection where the human immune system is so
badly damaged that it is at risk for opportunistic infections
(“OIs”).5
HIV is found in certain human body fluids. High levels of
HIV are found in blood, semen, pre-seminal fluid, breast milk,
vaginal fluids, and rectal mucous.6 According to AIDS.gov,
“other body fluids and waste products – like feces, nasal fluid,
saliva, sweat, tears, urine, or vomit – don’t contain enough HIV

3. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., What is HIV/AIDS?,
AIDS.GOV, http://aids.gov/hiv-aids-basics/hiv-aids-101/what-is-hiv-aids/ (last
revised Apr. 29, 2014).
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., How Do You Get HIV or
AIDS?, AIDS.GOV, http://aids.gov/hiv-aids-basics/hiv-aids-101/how-you-gethiv-aids/ (last revised June 16, 2014).
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to infect you, unless they have blood mixed in them and [a person
has] significant and direct contact with them.”7
HIV is transmitted through body fluids during sexual
contact, pregnancy, childbirth, breastfeeding, as a result of
injection drug use, occupational exposure, or as the result of a
blood transfusion with infected blood or an organ transplant
from an infected donor.8 With regard to injection drug use,
AIDS.gov explains that “[i]njecting drugs puts you in contact
with blood – your own and others, if you share needles . . . .
Needles or drugs that are contaminated with HIV-infected blood
can deliver the virus directly into your body.”9
AIDS.gov reports “more than 1.1 million people in the
United States are living with HIV infection, and almost 1 in 6
(15.8%) are unaware of their infection.”10
III. Dangerous Instrument and the Penal Law
The Penal Law defines “dangerous instrument” as “any
instrument, article, or substance . . . which, under the
circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or
threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or
serious physical injury.”11
In considering the meaning of dangerous and instrument
individually, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “dangerous” as
“likely to cause serious bodily harm” and “instrument” as “a
means by which something is achieved, performed, or
furthered.”12 With regard to the definitions of article and

7. See id.
8. See id. See also HIV Transmission, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/transmission.html (last updated
Jan. 16, 2015).
9. Id.
10. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HIV in the United States: At a
Glance, AIDS.GOV, http://aids.gov/hiv-aids-basics/hiv-aids-101/statistics/ (last
revised June 6, 2012) (referencing statistics gathered by the United States
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, specifically 18 CDC 5 (Oct. 2013))
(“Monitoring selected national HIV prevention and care objectives by using
HIV surveillance data – United States and 6 U.S. dependent areas – 2011; HIV
Surveillance Supplemental Report 2013).
11. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(13) (McKinney 2013).
12. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 176, 363 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
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substance, Black’s defines “article” as “a particular item or
thing” and “substance” as “any matter, especially an addictive
drug.”13
It is important to recognize that a dangerous instrument is
one which is “readily capable of causing death or serious physical
injury.”14 The Penal Law defines “serious physical injury” as
“physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or
which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement,
protracted impairment of health or protracted loss of
impairment of the function of any bodily organ.”15 Less than
serious physical injury is physical injury, for which the criminal
statute defines as “impairment of physical condition or
substantial pain.”16 In order for criminal liability under the
criminal statute involving the use of a dangerous weapon, the
instrument must be used, attempted to be used, or threatened
to be used against another and be readily capable of causing
death or serious physical injury. An instrument will not be
considered dangerous per se if it is used, attempted to be used,
or threatened to be used against another and is capable of only
causing physical injury.
Criminal liability for use of a dangerous instrument is most
commonly observed in criminal assault cases. According to the
Penal Law, a person is guilty of assault in the first degree when
“with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person,
he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by
means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.”17 If
charging the defendant with first degree assault cannot be
satisfied, he or she may be charged with assault in the second
degree, where criminal liability lies when “with intent to cause
serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury
to such person or to a third person;” or “[w]ith intent to cause
physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such
person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
felony).

Id. at 45, 685.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(13).
Id. § 10.00(10).
Id. § 10.00(9).
Id. § 120.10(1) (assault in the first degree in New York is a class B
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dangerous instrument.”18 Where the defendant does not act
with an intent to cause serious physical injury, he may still be
criminally liable for second degree assault where “he recklessly
causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a
deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.”19 Additionally, he
is criminally liable for second degree assault where “for a
purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he
intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness or other physical
impairment of injury to another person . . . without his consent
. . . by administering . . . a drug, substance . . . capable of
producing the same.”20 Where the defendant cannot be held
criminally liable for first or second degree assault, he may be
charged with third degree assault. According to the Penal Law,
the defendant is guilty of assault in the third degree when “with
intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such
injury to such person or to a third person,” or “he recklessly
causes physical injury to another person,” or “with criminal
negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by
means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.”21 It is
important to note that from first degree assault to third degree
assault, use of a dangerous instrument goes from use with an
intent to cause death or serious physical injury, to reckless use
that causes death or serious physical injury, to criminally
negligent use that causes death or serious physical injury,
respectively.22
According to Alan D. Marrus, “use of dangerous
[instruments] significantly elevates the level of . . . an assault
prosecution.”23
A dangerous instrument may elevate a
misdemeanor assault case to a felony assault, because an act
committed with an intent to cause physical injury is transformed
to an act committed with the same intent yet the greater
18. Id. § 120.05(1)-(2) (assault in the second degree is a class D felony).
19. Id. § 120.05(3).
20. Id. § 120.05(4).
21. Id. § 120.00(1)-(3) (assault in the third degree is a class A
misdemeanor).
22. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10(1). See also N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
120.05(1)-(2), 120.00(1)-(3).
23. Alan D. Marrus, Demonstrating That Defendant Did Not Use of
Possess Dangerous Instrument, in 1-NY CLS DESK ED. GILBERT’S CRIMINAL
PRACTICE, ANNUAL DIVISION 2 (2015).
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possibility of death or serious physical injury as the result of use
of a dangerous instrument.24 Because “the definition of a
dangerous instrument turns not on the inherent nature of an
item, but on the manner in which it is used, attempted, or
threatened to be used, almost any item can be a dangerous
instrument.”25 Therefore, according to Marrus, “any innocuous
item can be a dangerous instrument within the Penal Law
definition of dangerous instrument.”26
Another potential criminal charge involving a dangerous
instrument involves aggravated assault upon a police officer or
a peace officer. This section of the Penal Law charges a
defendant when “with intent to cause serious physical injury to
a person whom he knows or reasonably should know to be a
police officer or a peace officer engaged in the course of
performing his official duties, he causes such injury by means of
a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.”27 Many New York
cases dealing with dangerous instruments and assaults often
involve police or peace officers.
IV. Dangerous Instrument in New York Case Law
With regard to New York case law interpretations of
dangerous instrument, according to the Court of Appeals in
People v. Carter,28 Penal Law Section 10.00(13) “makes no
attempt to give an absolute definition of the term or to provide a
list of items which can be considered dangerous instruments.”29
Instead, “the statute states plainly that ‘any instrument, article,
or substance,’ no matter how innocuous it may appear to be
when used for its legitimate purpose, becomes a dangerous
instrument when it is used in a manner which renders it readily
capable of causing serious physical injury.”30 The court further
explained that “the object itself need not be inherently
24. Id.
25. Id. (emphasis added). For a list of potential dangerous instruments,
see infra note 34 and accompanying text.
26. Id.
27. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.11.
28. People v. Carter, 423 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1981).
29. Id. at 31.
30. Id.
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dangerous. It is the temporary use rather than the inherent vice
of the objects which brings it within the purview of the statute.”31
In People v. Rodriguez,32 the New York State Appellate Division,
First Department (“First Department”) stated “[u]nder New
York law, a ‘dangerous instrument’ is not merely one which
appears to be dangerous but one which, in fact, is readily capable
of causing death or serious physical injury.”33 Because an
instrument may be deemed dangerous because of its ready
capability for causing death or serious injury, those instruments
that are not designed as a weapon, such as a handkerchief, may
in situations of temporary use fit the statutory definition of a
dangerous instrument.34 The First Department explained in
People v. Cwikla, “[b]ecause the essence of ‘dangerous
instrument’ is the manner in which the item is used . . . even
ordinary items are included within its scope whenever they are
‘readily capable of causing death or other serious physical
injury.’”35
Other New York decisions have considered whether a
person’s body part qualifies as a dangerous instrument under
the Penal Law. In People v. Owusu,36 the Court of Appeals
examined the plain meaning of dangerous instrument and
reasoned that such an article “is a device which is capable of

31. Id.
32. People v. Rodriguez, 530 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1988).
33. Id. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. See People v. Cwikla, 400 N.Y.S.2d 35, 37 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1977).
For other instruments that may satisfy the statutory definition of dangerous
instrument, see also People v. Galvin, 481 N.E.2d 565 (N.Y. 1985) (sidewalk
considered a dangerous instrument where the victim’s injuries resulted from
the pounding of his head on the pavement); People v. Carter, 423 N.E.2d 30
(N.Y. 1981) (rubber boots on defendant’s feet were considered a dangerous
instrument when used to stomp upon the head and face of the victim, who had
fallen to the ground, causing the victim’s head to hit the pavement with
tremendous force); People v. Ozarowski, 344 N.E.2d 370 (N.Y. 1976) (baseball
bat was a dangerous instrument when used to strike the victim in the head
and thereby fracture the victim’s skull); People v. Greene, 899 N.Y.S.2d 401,
402 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2010) (“red-hot” barbecue fork a dangerous instrument
as used against victim, where defendant held fork against side of victim’s head
while victim was restrained, causing victim serious burns to his face, neck, and
ear).
35. Id.
36. People v. Owusu, 712 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1999).
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causing harm as defined by the statute.”37 In this case, the
defendant was charged with assault in the first degree for
causing serious physical injury with a dangerous instrument,
two counts of assault in the second degree for intentionally
causing serious physical injury and intentionally causing
physical injury with a dangerous instrument, and two counts of
assault in the third degree for intentionally causing physical
injury and causing injury with a dangerous instrument through
criminal negligence.38 The charges stemmed from an incident
where the defendant “forced his way into his estranged wife’s
apartment and became embroiled in a fight with another man,”
for which during the fight, the “defendant bit the victim’s finger
so severely that nerves were severed.”39 When considering
whether a person’s body part was a device capable of causing
harm, as defined by the statute, the court declined to hold that
“a [person’s] hands, teeth, and other body parts are . . . in
common parlance, instruments.”40 The court came to this
conclusion because it reasoned that neither the state legislature
nor New York courts had classified hands, teeth, or other body
parts as weapons or instruments.41 Regarding the state
legislature, the court stated that with regard to the
recodification of the Penal Law, “[t]he State Commission
Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code noted that the
proposed ‘dangerous instrument’ provision was meant to
‘include assaults committed with knives, crowbars, etc., as well
as those committed with firearms, blackjacks, metal knuckles,”
and other enumerated devices.42 Furthermore, the court
concluded that there was “no indication that the purpose [of the
revision committee] was to expand the definition of dangerous
instrument, as it was understood, to include the human body
itself.”43
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 1230.
Id. at 1229.
Id.
Id. at 1230.
Id.
Id. See also COMMISSION STAFF COMMENTS ON CHANGES IN THE NEW
PENAL LAW SINCE THE 1964 STUDY BILL, MCKINNEY’S REVISED PENAL LAW
SPECIAL PAMPHLET at 272, reprinted in 1969 GILBERT CRIMINAL LAW AND
PRACTICE, at 1D-15 (1969).
43. Owusu, 712 N.E.2d at 1230.
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The Owusu decision was reaffirmed by People v. Plunkett,44
where the Court of Appeals held that an individual’s body part,
even if used in a dangerous matter so as to produce injury, is not
a dangerous instrument within the meaning Penal Law Section
10.00(13). In addition, Plunkett extended the Owusu holding to
apply to the saliva of an HIV-positive defendant. In Plunkett,
the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault upon a police
officer or a peace officer, for which an element of the statutory
provision is the defendant’s use of a deadly weapon or dangerous
instrument.45 In the fact pattern, the defendant bit a police
officer on the finger as the officer tried to arrest him.46 At the
time of the incident, the defendant was HIV positive.47 The court
in Plunkett, discussing Owusu, adopted the notion that “a part
of one’s body is not encompassed by the terms [instrument,]
article, or substance as used in the statute.”48 According to the
court, in order to avoid a “sliding scale of criminal liability,” New
York jurisprudence recognized that it had to “[draw] the line at
a reasonable interpretation of the term ‘instrument.’”49 With
this in mind, the court reasoned that because saliva “came with”
the defendant, it would not be considered a dangerous
instrument.50 The court in effect decided against using saliva
for “penal enhancement.”51 As a result, in finding that an
individual’s saliva could not be considered a dangerous
instrument necessary to support a conviction for aggravated
assault on a police officer, the Court extended its opinion to
include the saliva of an HIV-positive defendant.52
V. Whether HIV in an Out-of-Body Form Constitutes a
Dangerous Instrument
While the saliva of an HIV-positive defendant may not be

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

People v. Plunkett, 971 N.E.2d 363 (N.Y. 2012).
Id. at 364. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.11.
Plunkett, 971 N.E.2d at 364.
Id.
Id. at 368; Owusu, 712 N.E.2d at 1230.
Plunkett, 971 N.E.2d at 368.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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considered a dangerous instrument when it “comes with” the
defendant’s body, the question remains whether HIV in an outof-body form can be considered a dangerous instrument when
administered by a defendant to another.
As stated in Part I, a common method of transmitting HIV
is through injection drug use. Such injection is usually
performed with a needle or syringe. Although HIV transmission
through injection is most commonly observed through drug use,
it is still possible for HIV transmission to occur where intended
drug use is not the base act of transmission. Situations arise
where it is possible for HIV to be transmitted to another
individual through a defendant’s criminal use, attempted use, or
threatened use of a needle or syringe.
The above situation was observed in People v. Nelson,53
where the court held that a hypodermic needle could constitute
a dangerous instrument depending on how the needle is used.
In Nelson, the defendant appeared before the complaining
witness, produced a hypodermic needle, claimed it contained the
AIDs virus, and pressed it against the complainant.54 The
defendant threatened to jab the complainant with the needle if
she did not open a cash register.55 After the complainant opened
the register, the defendant took cash and ran out of the store.56
The jury found the defendant criminally liable. Evidence
supported the jury’s conclusion that a hypodermic needle, when
used in the manner the defendant had used it, was readily
capable of causing serious physical injury, and as a result, the
hypodermic needle would constitute a dangerous instrument as
defined by Penal Law Section 10.00(13).57 With regard to the
claim that the hypodermic needle contained the AIDs virus, “the
prosecution was not required to prove the existence of the AIDs
virus since the indictment charged only that the defendant
possessed a dangerous weapon.”58
With regard to the Nelson holding, in the situation where a
defendant uses, attempts to use or threatens to use a
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

People v. Nelson, 627 N.Y.S.2d 412 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1995).
Id. at 412-13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 413.
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hypodermic needle or syringe containing HIV in an out-of-body
form to inflict serious physical injury upon another, the fact that
the hypodermic needle or syringe contains HIV in an out-of-body
form may not even matter when charging the defendant. The
prosecutor may simply argue under Nelson that because that
decision held that a hypodermic needle may constitute a
dangerous instrument under the Penal Law depending on its
use, and since the defendant used, attempted to use or
threatened to use the hypodermic needle against an individual,
this in itself would subject the defendant to harsher penalties
under the Penal Law because of the potential serious physical
injury to be sustained by the victim by the hypodermic needle.
This outcome would occur even though the hypodermic needle
contained HIV in a non-saliva, out-of-body, readily
transmittable form, a form which could potentially allow for the
transmission of HIV to the victim through injection.
In addition to the above analysis, the administering of HIV
in an out-of-body form by means of a hypodermic needle or
syringe may satisfy dangerous instrument requirements and
circumvent the holding established by Plunkett because in the
case of an HIV-positive defendant, HIV would not be delivered
from the defendant’s body to the victim by a part of the
defendant’s body. In essence, in the situation where the
defendant is not HIV-positive, it cannot be said that the
administering of HIV through use, attempted use or threatened
use of a hypodermic needle or syringe constitutes a transmission
of HIV from the defendant’s body, because it may be separate
and not directly sourced from the defendant’s own affliction, so
as to hold that it does not “come with” the defendant because he
is not infected. The argument may also be proffered that even if
a defendant seeks to administer HIV through use, attempted use
or threatened use of a hypodermic needle or syringe, where the
out-of-body form of HIV is directly sourced from the defendant
himself, this out-of-body form may not constitute “coming with”
the defendant’s body in a sense that it is not administered
directly from the defendant’s body but from a hypodermic needle
or syringe. Thus, it would be understood that the hypodermic
needle or syringe is neither a part of the defendant’s own body
nor “comes with” the defendant’s body, but rather is a separate
instrument distinct from the defendant’s body.
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The Plunkett holding is also circumvented by the fact that it
only holds that the saliva of an HIV-positive defendant is not a
dangerous instrument under the Penal Law. The decision does
not consider whether HIV in other forms, including other out-ofbody forms, may be considered dangerous instruments.
VI. Hypodermic Needle Considered a Deadly Weapon?
Elsewhere in case law analysis, certain cases have held that
a hypodermic needle containing HIV constitutes a deadly
weapon under other statutory provisions. In State v. Ainis,59 the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County
held that a hypodermic needle as used by the defendant was a
dangerous weapon. On June 19, 1997, the defendant entered a
convenience store and approached a clerk while holding a
hypodermic needle in his hand.60 The defendant stated to the
clerk, “Give me all the money unless you want to get AIDS,” and
defendant threatened to kill the clerk, for which the clerk gave
money in the register to the defendant.61 The defendant was
apprehended, charged, and pled guilty to charges of robbery,
among other charges.62 In considering whether the hypodermic
needle constituted a deadly weapon under the No Early Release
Act,63 which mandates that “persons who are sentenced to prison
terms for committing crimes of the first and second degree
involving violence be required to serve at least 85 percent of the
term of incarceration imposed by the court before being eligible
for parole,”64 the court determined that the hypodermic needle
as used in the case “must absolutely be considered a deadly
weapon.”65
The court stated, “to conclude from [the]
circumstances that the needle was not a deadly weapon would
defy common sense and fly in the face of rational thinking.”66 The
court continued, “[i]t is generally known that AIDS is a deadly
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

State v. Ainis, 721 A.2d 329 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998).
Id. at 330.
Id.
Id.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43-7.2 (West 2013).
Ainis, 721 A.2d at 330-31.
Id. at 332.
Id. (emphasis added).
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disease, it is obvious that the defendant intended to create the
impression that he had a deadly weapon and was willing to use
it, and the clerk had every reason to believe that she was being
threatened with death or serious bodily injury.”67 The court in
reaching its decision also considered the Nelson decision. It also
analyzed a Californian court interpretation of what constitutes
a deadly weapon, specifically the case of People v. Autry.68 The
court in Ainis quoted the Autry court, which reasoned, “a
contaminated hypodermic needle is one of the more deadly
objects one can imagine outside of firearms . . . a single nick or
scratch [from a contaminated needle] may prove fatal.”69 With
this reasoning, the Ainis court concluded that “the hypodermic
needle purportedly infected with the AIDS virus is a deadly
weapon.”70 Although this conclusion would persuasively support
a prosecution in New York, it must be recognized that the Ainis
holding pertains to deadly weapon and not dangerous
instrument.
Although generally recognized as a more serious
instrument, a deadly weapon requires a different standard than
a dangerous instrument. Creative prosecutions would need to
argue that if a hypodermic needle can be considered a deadly
weapon in certain jurisdictions, such a classification is more
serious than labeling a hypodermic needle a dangerous
instrument. In a sense, the fact that a hypodermic needle may
be considered a deadly weapon almost per se recognizes that it
could also be considered the “lesser included” dangerous
instrument that is often statutorily defined along with deadly
weapon.
VII. Statutory Punishment for Knowing Transmission of HIV
The Penal Law does not expressly provide a criminal statute
provision that specifically punishes the knowing transmission of
HIV; however, a person infected with an STD which can cause
death, such as HIV, and who commits sex crimes or has

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
People v. Autry, 283 Cal. Rptr. 417 (Ct. App. 1991).
See Ainis, 721 A.2d at 333; Autry, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
Ainis, 721 A.2d at 334.
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unprotected sex without telling his or her partner of the infection
may be guilty of reckless endangerment.71 In general, New York
deals with HIV-related prosecutions, but does not have an HIVspecific statute.72 Elsewhere in New York statutory law, the
Public Health Law provides that someone who knowingly is
infected with an “infectious venereal disease” who has sexual
intercourse with another is guilty of a misdemeanor; however,
there is no indication in New York statutes that HIV is
considered a venereal disease.73 It must also be considered that
the above statute proscribes a person infected with an
“infectious venereal disease” from having sexual intercourse
with another, rather than knowing transmission of HIV through
a dangerous instrument. In general, it is understood that New
York law allows for the prosecution of HIV-positive defendants
under general criminal laws in lieu of specific and defined HIV
exposure criminal statutory provisions.
Other jurisdictions have enacted statutory provisions,
which impose criminal liability upon defendants who knowingly
transmit HIV to another. To be precise, over thirty states have
HIV-specific laws, which criminalize actions taken by people
living with HIV.74 States that have an HIV-specific statute and
71. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.25 (“a person is guilty of reckless endangerment
in the first degree when, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference
to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of
death to another person”). Reckless endangerment in the first degree is a Class
D felony. For case law on reckless endangerment and HIV, see People v.
Williams, 974 N.Y.S.2d 742 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2013) (“evidence before grand
jury was legally insufficient to find defendant’s conduct of not informing sexual
partner of his HIV positive status presented grave risk of death to victim, and
therefore warranted reducing charges of reckless endangerment in the first
degree to reckless endangerment in the second degree”).
72. When Sex Is a Crime and Spit Is a Dangerous Weapon: A Snapshot of
HIV Criminalization in the United States, CTR. FOR HIV L. & POL’Y, available
at
http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/sites/www.hivlawandpolicy.org/files/
Snapshot%20of%20HIV%20Criminalization.pdf (last visited April 8, 2014)
[hereinafter When Sex Is a Crime].
73. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2307 (McKinney 2013). For a list of sexually
transmissible diseases as defined in New York, see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 10, § 23.1 (1953) (grouping sexually transmissible diseases into
Group A, B, C, and D).
74. For a list of these states, see Criminal Statutes on HIV transmission,
KAISER
FAMILY
FOUND.,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp/ind=5698cat=11
(last
visited February 20, 2014).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/8

14

2014

A DANGEROUS SITUATION

799

have had at least one prosecution involving an HIV-positive
defendant in the past two years include Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia.75 States which have
an HIV-specific statute with no recent reported prosecutions
include Alaska, Montana, and Nebraska.76 Similar to New York,
states that deal with HIV-related prosecutions but do not have
an HIV-specific statute include Delaware, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Oregon, Texas, and Vermont.77 States that have
had five or more HIV-positive defendants prosecuted include
Florida, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee,
and Texas.78
A state-by-state analysis showcases that various states
statutorily punish HIV-positive defendants who transmit HIV
with a variety of punishments.
A defendant is criminally liable for the offense of knowingly
exposing another to HIV in Arkansas if he knows that he has
tested positive for HIV and exposes it to another through the
transfer of blood or other blood products without having first
informed the other person.79
Georgia sanctions an HIV-positive defendant who
“knowingly allows another person to use a hypodermic needle,
syringe, or both . . . and the needle or syringe so used had been
previously used by the HIV-infected person . . . .”80 In addition,
the code provides that “any person [afflicted] with HIV who
assaults a police officer or correctional officer with intent to
infect such an officer shall be sentenced to at least five years in
prison if convicted.”81
75. When Sex is a Crime, supra note 72.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (1989).
80. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c)(2) (2003).
81. Id. § 16-5-60(d)(1)-(2). See generally Burk v. State, 478 S.E.2d 416 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1996) (HIV positive defendant convicted of misdemeanor reckless
endangerment for attempting to bite a police officer).
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In Idaho, “one who exposes another with intent to infect, or
transfers, or attempts to transfer bodily fluid, knowing that he
or she is HIV afflicted, is guilty of a felony,” for which consent
and medical advice are affirmative defenses available to the
charged defendant.82 Meanwhile, in Indiana, a defendant who
“recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally . . . transfers blood or a
blood component containing antibodies for HIV” is charged with
committing a felony.83
Iowa punishes the criminal transmission of HIV, specifically
where a defendant, “knowing that his or her HIV status is
positive . . . engages in intimate contact . . . with another person;
transfers, donates, or provides blood, semen, tissue, organs, or
other potentially infectious bodily fluids for transfusion,
transplantation, insemination or other administration to
another person.”84 The statute does not require actual infection
with HIV to have occurred in the victim for the defendant to have
committed criminal transmission of HIV; however, “an
affirmative defense that the person exposed to the HIV knew
that the infected person was HIV-positive at the time of the
exposure, [or] knew that the action of exposure could result in
transmission, and consented to the action of exposure with that
knowledge.”85
It is a class A misdemeanor in Kansas for a defendant,
aware of his own HIV infection, to “share with another
individual a hypodermic needle, syringe, or both, for the
introduction of drugs or any other substance, or for the
withdrawal of blood or body fluids from, the individual’s body
with the intent to expose another person to a life threatening
communicable disease.”86
In Louisiana, “intentional exposure of another to the AIDS
virus . . . through any means of contact . . . without knowing and
lawful consent, is a crime of violence with enhanced penalties
where the potential victim is a police officer.”87
82. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608 (1988).
83. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-12-15 (West 2014).
84. IOWA CODE § 709C.1 (2013).
85. Id.
86. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5424 (2011).
87. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (1987). See Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d
229, 235 (La. 1994) (violation requires a showing that the infected person knew
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A defendant in Maryland who has HIV and knowingly
transfers or attempts to transfer HIV to another individual is
guilty of a misdemeanor.88 In Montana, statutory provisions are
broader, for “a person infected with an STD who knowingly
exposes another person to infection is guilty of a
misdemeanor.”89
Likewise, in Missouri it is unlawful “for any individual
knowingly infected with HIV to . . . act in a reckless manner by
exposing another person to HIV without the knowledge and
consent of that person to be exposed to HIV through . . . the
sharing of needles, or by biting another person.”90
Nevada law makes it “a felony for a person who has tested
HIV positive to knowingly or willfully act in a manner intended
or likely to transmit the disease to another.”91 A defendant
charged with a felony under this statute does have an
affirmative defense, one that “the exposed person knew the
defendant was HIV positive and that the conduct could result in
exposure and knowingly consented to such conduct.”92
North Dakota makes it a Class A felony for “an HIV-infected
person to knowingly transfer . . . blood . . . by shared hypodermic
needle use.”93 An affirmative defense to a violation by sexual
contact is that the activity occurred between consenting adults
after full disclosure of risk and with the use of a prophylactic
devise.94
The Oklahoma criminal code makes it a felony for “any
person with HIV or AIDS who engages in conduct reasonably
likely to result in the transfer of the person’s blood, bodily
fluids95 containing visible blood . . . into the bloodstream of
another, or through the skin or other membranes of another
person . . . if the person with HIV and AIDS engages in such
conduct with intent to infect another person and the other
or should have known he was infected).
88. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-339 (West 2002). See North v.
North, 648 A.2d 1025, 1038 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (Cathell, J., dissenting).
89. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-18-112, 50-18-113 (1995).
90. MO. REV. STAT. § 191.677 (2002).
91. NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.205 (1995).
92. Id.
93. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17 (1989).
94. Id.
95. As defined by OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-502.3 (1992).
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person did not give informed consent to the transfer.”96
Similar to Georgian and North Dakotan criminal code
provisions, South Carolina makes it a felony for a person
afflicted with HIV “to knowingly . . . share a hypodermic needle,
syringe, or both with another person without first informing that
person that the needle, syringe, or both has been used by
someone infected with HIV.”97
Exposure of another to HIV is a criminal offense in
Tennessee. “A person commits the offense when the person is
infected with HIV and knowingly engages in the . . . transfer of
blood . . . or another potentially infectious bodily fluids for . . .
administration to another in any manner.”98 This criminal
exposure of another to HIV is a Class C felony.99
Lastly, the state of Washington holds a defendant guilty of
assault in the first degree when he or she, “with intent to inflict
great bodily harm, administers, exposes, transmits to, or causes
to be taken by another the HIV virus.”100
VIII. Should New York Enact Legislation Specifically
Criminalizing the Knowing Transmission of HIV?
According to the Center for HIV Law and Policy:
From the beginning of the HIV epidemic, fear and
ignorance about HIV’s routes and relative risks of
transmission have fueled a backlash against
people living with HIV, most evident in the laws
that punish them for engaging in consensual sex
or activities that pose no risk of HIV transmission.
The media coverage that accompanies these cases
often demonizes people with HIV and
misrepresents the risk of transmission, helping to
perpetuate stigma that results in denial of jobs
and services and decreased willingness to get

96. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (1999).
97. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (1990).
98. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-13-109 (2011).
99. Id.
100. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.011 (West 1997).
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tested. Because there is no evidence that HIVspecific criminal laws and prosecutions have any
effect on behavior, the argument that these laws
serve a deterrent effect is unfounded. Punishing
people for behavior that is either consensual or
poses no risk of HIV transmission only serves to
further
stigmatize
already
marginalized
communities while missing opportunities for
prevention education.101
The Center for HIV Law and Policy also argues that HIV
criminalization laws have a negative impact:
1. There is no evidence that criminalization
laws deter risky behavior.
2. Studies have found no differences in risky
sexual behavior between residents living
in a state with a specific disclosure law
compared to residents living in a state
without such a law.
3. Even when people are aware that an HIVspecific law exists in a particular state,
they usually do not understand how the
law functions (e.g., types of sexual
behavior/activity requiring disclosure,
penalty for non-disclosure, etc.).
4. Criminalization sends the inaccurate
message that attempting to avoid sexual
partners with HIV is an adequate
prevention strategy.
5. HIV criminalization laws weaken the
message that sexual health is the

101. Criminal
Law,
CTR.
FOR
HIV
L.
&
POL’Y,
http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/issues/criminal-law (last visited Feb. 17,
2015). The Center for HIV Law and Policy “is a national legal and policy
resource and strategy center working to reduce the impact of HIV on
vulnerable and marginalized communities and to secure the human rights of
people affected by HIV.” About the Center for HIV Law and Policy, CTR. FOR
HIV LAW & POL’Y, http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/about (last visited May 21,
2015).
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responsibility of both partners during sex
and increase stigma by strengthening the
culture of blame surrounding infection.
6. Treatment reduces transmission risk
through all routes to near-zero.
7. HIV Criminalization is based on and
reinforces grossly inaccurate perceptions
of the actual routes and relative risks of
HIV
transmission.102
According to the Presidential Advisory Council on
HIV/AIDS, “clearly the use of HIV-specific criminal laws, of
felony laws such as attempted murder and aggravated assault,
and of sentence enhancements to prosecute HIV-positive
individuals are based on outdated and erroneous believes about
the routes, risks, and consequences of HIV transmission.”103
Furthermore, “legal standards applied in HIV criminalization
cases regarding intent, harm, and proportionality deviate from
generally accepted criminal law principles and reflect stigma
toward HIV and HIV-positive individuals.”104
The above are considerations that the New York State
Legislature must take when determining whether to create
legislation that specifically criminalizes the knowing
transmission of HIV.
In enacting a new statute that
criminalizes knowing transmission of HIV, legislators must
weigh deterring HIV positive persons from knowingly
transmitting HIV with the stigmatization that comes from
prosecuting an individual afflicted with HIV. Legislators must
also be aware of the great advances in medical technology that
have made treatment of HIV more efficient and effective.

102. When Sex Is a Crime, supra note 72.
103. Presidential Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS (PACHA), Resolution on
Ending Federal and State HIV-Specific Criminal Laws, Prosecutions, and Civil
Commitments,
AIDS.GOV,
at
1,
http://aids.gov/federalresources/pacha/meetings/2013/feb-2013-criminalization-resolution.pdf
(accessed on Feb, 20, 2014)
104. Id.
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IX. Conclusion
The knowing transmission of HIV in an out-of-body form
through the use, attempted use or threatened use of a
hypodermic needle or syringe satisfies the definition of
“dangerous instrument” as described in the Penal Law and New
York case law. The fact that the hypodermic needle or syringe
even contains HIV may not be a determining factor with regard
to dangerous instrument, because the hypodermic needle or
syringe itself may constitute a dangerous instrument without
need for considering the out-of-body form of HIV. With regard
to HIV criminalization in New York and whether the state
legislature should adopt HIV criminalization statutes that
would proscribe the knowing transmission of HIV in an out-ofbody form through a hypodermic needle or syringe,
stigmatization and other problems warrant that New York
would be better suited to continuing prosecution of HIV-positive
defendants under the Penal Law, which in itself allows for
charging a defendant regardless of his or her HIV affliction.
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